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Abstract
The Internet of Things (IoT) and Industrial IoT
(IIoT) is enabled by Wireless Personal Area Network
(WPAN) devices. However, these devices increase
vulnerability concerns of the IIoT and resultant
Critical Infrastructure (CI) risks. Secure IIoT is
enabled by both pre-attack security and post-attack
forensic
analysis.
Radio
Frequency
(RF)
Fingerprinting enables both pre- and post-attack
security by providing serial-number level identification
of devices through fingerprint characterization of their
emissions. For classification and verification, research
has shown high performance by employing the neural
network-based Generalized Relevance Learning
Vector Quantization-Improved (GRLVQI) classifier.
However, GRLVQI has numerous hyperparameters
and tuning requires AI expertise, thus some
researchers have abandoned GRLVQI for notionally
simpler, but less accurate, methods. Herein, we
develop a fool-proof approach for tuning AI
algorithms. For demonstration, Z-Wave, an insecure
low-power/cost WPAN technology, and the GRLVQI
classifier are considered. Results show significant
increases in accuracy (5% for classification, 50%
verification) over baseline methods.

1. Introduction
The commercial internet of things (IoT) is enabled
by low-cost and low-power Wireless Personal Area
Network (WPAN) devices which create mesh
networks and allow for widespread interaction and
monitoring of smart devices [1]. Due to their abilities,
relatively insecure WPAN devices, such as Z-Wave
and ZigBee, find their way into Industrial IoT (IIoT)
applications, including Critical Infrastructure (CI) uses
[2]. Inherent vulnerabilities exist in WPAN
technologies, see [3], which is compounded due to
device-to-internet pathways, sensitivity of the CI
applications, and that one compromised device can
threaten the security of the entire network [4].
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Robust security is of interest for both pre-attack
defense and post-attack forensics by improving the
ability to determine WPAN device identities. A general
understanding of ISO layers (NWK: Network, MAC:
Media Access Control, and PHY: Physical) and their
relationship to security can be considered as [5]:
1. “Something you know” (NWK – encryption keys)
2. “Something you have” (MAC – MAC address)
3. “Something you are” (PHY – RF Fingerprints)
However, predominantly, WPAN security
considers bit-level identities (MAC and NWK); thus
ignoring intrinsic properties found at the PHY layer.
Whether addressing pre-attack defense or postattack forensic analysis, the preponderance of threat
detection and protection work in process control
systems occurs above the PHY layer. Radio Frequency
(RF) fingerprinting involves computing features,
“fingerprints,” for predefined signal regions, such as
preambles, by dividing the signal into bins and
computing statistical features for each bin [6]. For this,
the standard three step biometric process (library
building, classifier model development, and
verification) [7], is followed. Key to this are accurate
machine learning (ML) methods.
The Generalized Relevance Learning Vector
Quantization-Improved (GRLVQI) classifier, a
nonlinear Artificial Neural Network (ANN) algorithm,
has been shown to provide good discrimination ability
for RF Fingerprinting [5]. However, GRLVQI, as with
other ANN algorithms, has multiple hyperparameters,
which require luck or expertise to tune effectively. In
general, there are “no hard-and-fast rules” in
determining hyperparameter and their selection is part
of the “art of [algorithm] design” [8]. Prior works in
related areas such as feature selection, have even cited
the complexity of the task of hyperparameter selection
and tuning as a reason to utilize more simple ML
algorithms [9]. In some cases - particularly in postattack forensics where the amount of data may be very
large – this could limit the utility of more powerful
computing paradigms, such as ANNs. This is further
exacerbated by the difficulty of data collection - and
even attribution of results - from Operational
Technology (OT) systems in Supervisory Control and
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Data Acquisition (SCADA) and CI environments
where specific system expertise is most likely required
[10]. To that end, quality ML models are often handcrafted and require significant expertise (i.e., luck and
talent) to appropriately train and deploy. Care is needed
in the specification of ML models too, since an overly
conservative learning rate results in sub-optimal
performance preventing convergence. However, an
overly liberal learning rate could result in highly
oscillatory training behavior, again, with sub-optimal
performance. Thus, to serve the pre-attack or postattack needs of an IIoT system, a global goal of any
proposed technique should be to maximize the
efficiency of the algorithm, harness the full power of
the best available algorithms for the task, and minimize
the expert knowledge – both in system and algorithm.
Prior work, c.f. [5] [6], examined full factorial
design of experiments (DoE) and hill-climbing
approaches. However, both of these approaches had
significant
limitations.
DoE
methods
are
comptuationally costly and only explore limited
regions of the operating space and while hill-climbing
methods quickly become trapped by local optima. An
additional limitation is neither can handle both discrete
and continuous variables.
Recently, Bayesian
Optimization (BO) has been shown to be superior to
other hyperparameter determination methods in both
efficiency and model accuracy. BO exploits the
randomness inherent in stochastic processes, such as
ANNs, and finds viable operating points.
The contributions of our paper are as follows. This
work compares four hyperparameter optimization
methods for WPAN security using the GRLVQI
algorithm as the representative classifier. The four
methods are BO, leveraging the process of [11],
Stochastic Approximation (SA) [6], and DoE [5]. An
extension of CRISP-DM is used to create a repeatable
process for this purpose using experimentally collected
Z-Wave RF Fingerprints. We apply the four
hyperparameter optimization methods to GRLVQI and
aim to make the experiments as similar as possible.
Evaluations consider both classification (1 vs N) and
verification (1 vs 1 claimed identity) with results
showing the BO-optimized GRLVQI outperforms past
work by 50% in true verification rate accuracy. We
further illustrate how BO offers better accuracy, easier
operations than other methods, and greater
understanding algorithmic hyperparameter space.

2. Background
With expansions of the IoT, the cyber attack surface
is increasing due to the multitude of sub-internet
pathways. Some examples are common WPAN
technologies such as WiFi, Z-Wave, ZigBee and

Bluetooth devices. This includes expansions of the
IIoT into SCADA [12] systems and CI.
Problematically, WPAN devices serve as the backbone
for IoT and IIoT connectivity and these often have
notable security deficiencies.
Related to the WPAN devices, the industrial
systems WPAN technologies thrust into the IIoT fall
under the banner of OT, as noted in Section 1. Many, if
not nearly all, OT systems in operation were desiged to
operate, sense, or monitor an industiral process safely
and reliably [13]. As the IoT and OT systems converge
in the IIoT, the introduction of OT to these wireless
networks has outpaced the inclusion of adequate
security measures, or been unable to simply adopt a
known cybersecurity practice [13]. Furthermore, OT
systems often require system-by-system expertise [10].
The expert knowledge paradigm within OT is an
obvious drawback for any system defense framework
or forensic analysis technique, it opens an opportunity
for exploiting knowledge of the better known WPAN
technologies. One such WPAN technology used in
IIoT applications is Z-Wave.

2.1. Z-Wave Devices
Z-Wave is a WPAN technology that offers both
small and low-cost hardware devices that support many
network topologies [14]. Practically, Z-Wave is similar
to ZigBee and other technologies, but is simpler to
work with [14], differences also exist in security,
operating frequency, data rate, and latency. Primarily,
the proprietary nature of the Z-Wave standard and lack
of initial encyption result in Z-Wave being less secure
than competing WPAN technologies [15]. Basic
knowledge of Z-Wave suggests it has a similar ISO
architecture to ZigBee due to its adherence to the ITUT G.9959 protocol at the PHY and MAC layers [16].
However, as illustrated in Figure 1, details above the
MAC layer are unknown. Therefore, to understand ZWave, digital forensics, c.f. [17], are necessary and an
emerging area of interest [3].

Figure 1. Z-Wave device protocol
characteristics, from [6].
The PHY packet structure of Z-Wave is
conceptualized in Figure 2. This illustrates two critical
components of the Z-Wave protocol: the predefined
preamble and the Start of Frame (SoF) [18]. Z-Wave
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is also known to include a 32-bit payload-based home
identification and 8-bit source identification [15].

Figure 2. Z-Wave signal characteristics, from [6].

2.2 RF-DNA Fingerprinting
RF Fingerprinting was implemented per the RFDNA (Distinct Native Attributes) fingerprinting
process of [19]. RF-DNA is a systematic process of RF
Fingerprinting that involves selecting an ROI to
extract, then digital filtering, along with computating
the instantaneous amplitude, frequency and phase,
fingerprint generation, and finally classifier model
development and verification testing [19]. RF-DNA
provides biometric-like security of communication
devices with discrimination abilities at the serialnumber level.
2.2.1. Z-Wave Signal Collection and PreClassification Signal Processing. Of interest in RF
Fingerprinting of Z-Wave devices is exploiting the
knowledge that the Preamble and SoF have a
predefined and known order of 1s and 0s which should
be the same for all Z-Wave devices. Thus, we aim to
discriminate between individual Z-Wave devices based
on minute variations in the preamble signals.
As described in [5] [6], to create a Z-Wave
database, three devices (ND = 3), were considered with
each device being an Aeon Labs’ Aeotec Z-Stick S2
transmitters. For each device, a total of 230 preamble
responses were collected [5]. The preamble response
(the first 8.3 ms of Z-Wave bursts) was the region of
interest (ROI) for studying this data and thus devices
were turned on/off to collect preamble data without
necessarily completing package delivery [5].
As discussed in [5] [6], for data collection each
device was placed 10 cm in line of sight from a
vertically-oriented log periodic antenna (LP0410, Ettus
Research, Santa Clara, CA). The antenna was
connected via a Gigabit Ethernet cable directly to a
software defined radio device RF input (USRP-2921,
National Instruments) [5] [6].
Signals were collected with a sample frequency of
fs = 2 Msps along with the bursts detected via an
amplitude-based leading edge detector with a -6 dB
threshold [5] [6]. The collected bursts had a native
Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR) at SNRC = 24.0 dB amd
were liked filtered [6]. To replicate more real world
(degraded and distant) conditions, and consistent with
[20], independent like-filtered
Additive White
Gaussian Noise (AWGN) was applied to achieve

operating conditions of SNR  [0 24.0] dB in 2 dB
increments [6].
Due to the size of the data, i.e. only 3 devices
considered, and the manual workload required to
collect additional data, all devices were considered as
serving in “authorized” roles. Thus, impersonation
attacks by “rogue” devices are not considered
2.2.2. Fingerprint Generation. Consistent with [20],
RF-DNA fingerprint generation begins by computating
the instantaneous time domain responses of amplitude
(𝑎), phase (𝜙), and frequency (𝑓) for the signal. These
responses are then divided into NR contiguous and
equal length bins and then Ns = 3 features of variance
(𝜎 2 ), skewness (𝛾), and kurtosis (𝜅) are computed [19],
[20]. As conceptualized in Figure 3, Ns features are
computed for each bin and across the entire response
for a total of NR + 1 features per amplitude, phase, and
frequency response at a given SNR [19], [20]. From
this, one considers RF regional fingerprint vectors as
(1)
2
𝑭𝑅𝑖 = [𝜎𝑅𝑖
, 𝛾𝑅𝑖 , 𝜅𝑅𝑖 ]1×3 ,
where 𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑁𝑅 + 1, for the NS = 3 RF fingerprint
features (statistics) [19], [20].

Figure 3. RF fingerprinting concept, from [20].
From RF regional fingerprint vectors, a fingerprint
vector for each of the responses is formed from (1) as,
𝑭𝐶 = [𝑭𝑅 1 𝑭𝑅 2 ⋯ 𝑭𝑅 (𝑁𝑅 +1) ]

1×𝑁𝑠 (𝑁𝑅 +1)

,

(2)

which are concatenated to form the fingerprint vector:
(3)
𝑭 = [𝑭𝒂 ⋮ 𝑭𝝓 ⋮ 𝑭𝒇 ]1×𝑁 (𝑁 +1)×𝑁 .
𝑠

𝑅

𝐶

Consistent with [5] [6], NR = 20 subregions
spanning the ROI were considered for Z-Wave devices.
Given the 230 preambles collected per Z-Wave device
and the NR , a total of NF = 189 features (𝑎, 𝜙, and 𝑓
responses with 𝜎 2 , 𝛾, and 𝜅 features) were computed
with equal splitting of the data between training and
testing in an interleaved manner with NTRN = 115
Training (TNG) and NTST = 115 Testing (TST)
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preamble observations per device. Thus, with NC = 3
devices, our dataset has a total of NTRN = 345 and
NTST = 345 observations, each with NF = 189
fingerprint features. To avoid the possibility of
overfitting, TNG and TST data were sequestered.

2.3. Classifier Models
Various classifiers have been applied to RF and RFDNA fingerprints, including Multiple Discriminant
Analysis (MDA) [19], GRLVQI [5], and random
forests [21]. Of interest herein is GRLVQI which has
1) a well known trackrecord for valid RF
Fingerprinting classification [5], but also 2) a variety of
hyperparameters to select. MDA is of further interest
to provide a performance baseline. Furthermore, both
MDA and GRLVQI have their own performance
advantages in RF fingerprinting problems [5] [6].
2.4.1. GRLVQI Classifier Model. GRLVQI belongs
to the neural network family of algorithms known as
self-organizing ANNs [22]. GRLVQI is an extension,
see [8], of the Learning Vector Quantization (LVQ)
approach of Kohonen [23]. LVQ methods employ
nearest neighbor approaches through the nearest node,
or prototype vector (PV) in LVQ terminology, whereby
each PV is iteratively moved to characterize the data
through a lower dimensionality structure that captures
the data’s characteristics [24]. Practically, LVQ
algorithms train PVs to a given class label by moving
correctly classified PVs closer to a given class and
moving incorrectly classified PVs away.
LVQ has seen many embellishments which create
new algorithms [25], GRLVQI is one such algorithm
and the additional letters in the acronym signify each
embellishment: G (generalized) for the inclusion of a
sigmoidal cost function [26], R (relevance) for the
incorporation of an extra loop for relevance learning
[27], and I (improved) for improvements in PV update
logic and operation [8]. The improvements of GRLVQI
over GRLVQ [27] include the conscience learning of
DeSieno [28], improved PV update logic, and a
frequency based maximum input update strategy [8].
When compared to the simple conceptualization of
LVQ, GRLVQI is much more complicated. Both
employ a gradient descent learning rate (𝜖) to
determine how fast the PVs move [23], and the number
of prototype vectors (NPV) per class determine network
size. GRLVQI also has a relevance learning rate (𝜉)
to determines how quickly variables are penalized for
being possibly insignificant [27].
Additionally,
GRLVQI employs conscience rates (𝛾 and 𝛽)
determine how frequently individual PVs should be
moved [8]. Thus, GRLVQI has 5 hyperparameters to
consider. Additionally, GRLVQI is stochastic in

nature, as are ANNs in general, and results may vary
based on random selection of training data.
2.4.2. Multiple Discriminant Analysis (MDA).
MDA is a linear approach to classification which
considers an eigenvector-based projection of the data
relative to a ratio of between-group to within-group
sum-of-squares, known as the Fisher criterion [19].
For RF-DNA fingerprints, MDA considers input
fingerprint matrix F and NC classes. Thus, MDA is
largely intuitive in how it operates, is not stochastic,
and it is also computationally inexpensive. However,
MDA can encounter difficulties with highly nonlinear
data or when the number of features approaches, or
exceeds, the number of observations. For Z-Wave
data, MDA generally underperforms GRLVQI in
classification, but outperforms it in verification [5].

2.5. Quantifying Algorithm Performance
To evaluate WPAN device security, two general
considerations exist: classification and verification.
Classification considers “one vs. many,” and is
evaluated using confusion matrices for classifier
models trained at each SNR operating point [19].
Verification is considered as a “one vs one” claimed
identity scenario for a classifier model at a specific SNR
with the signal compared using the classifier model and
the associated probability mass function [5].
2.5.1. Classification
Metrics.
Classification
performance is evaluated using two metrics, gain and
Relative Accuracy Percentage (RAP), from examining
a plot of average percent correct classification (%C)
versus SNR [5].
Gain is defined as the reduction in required SNR,
expressed in dB, for two methods to achieve the same
%C, i.e. an arbitrary performance benchmark of %C =
90% [5] [19]. Per [5], gain values, GSNR, is interpretted:
1) GSNR < 0.0 (negative), a method achieves the same
%C at a higher SNR, i.e. it underperforms.
2) GSNR = 0.0, a given method achieves the same %C
as the baseline at the same SNR
3) GSNR > 0.0 (positive), a method achieves the same
%C at a lower SNR, i.e. it outperforms.
However, gain only considers one part of the %C vs.
SNR curve and it might not have a value if a method
never reaches 90%. Thus, Relative Accuracy
Percentage (RAP) and Area Under Classification
Curve (AUCC) were introduced in [5]. RAP values are
the computed by finding the AUCC for perfect
accuracy across the x-axis and then dividing
AUCCmethod by AUCCperfect. RAP is compared with
higher RAP indicating better overall accuracy.
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2.5.2. Verification
Metrics.
Verification,
as
described in [19], involves: 1) an unknown device
claiming bit level credentials (e.g., MAC address)
which match a specific authorized device, 2) extracting
RF fingerprint features from the unknown device, and
3) comparing new RF fingerprints against the model.
Verification performance is evaluated using Receiver
Operating Characteristic (ROC) curves at a specified
SNR for True Verification Rate (TVR) versus False
Reject Rate (FRR); in experimentation this is typically
at the lowest SNR a model achieves %C = 90% [5].
Two metrics can be computed [5]: firstly, the
percentage authorized (%Aut) at TVR ≥ 90% at FVR ≤
10%. However, %Aut is coarse and dichotomous, e.g.
ND = 3 devices %Aut  [0, 33, 66, 100], and thus
distinguishing
between
relative
performance
differences is impossible, thus we also consider the
mean area of the ROC curves (AUCM) [5].

3. Hyperparameter Optimization
Hyperparameter determination is an emerging
discipline in AI and includes a multitude of methods.
A general taxonomy of these approaches is presented
in [11]. These can largely be separated into model-free
and model-based approaches [29].
Model-free approaches can be 1) scientific, e.g.
grid searches, or 2) haphazard, e.g. a coder
experientially finding settings that “just work,” or 3)
random searches which use random seeds (notably a
competitive method). Model-based approaches
employ a wrapper on an outer loop around the
algorithm of interest and determine settings to explore
in a concerted search strategy. From the families of
model-based approaches listed in [11], we consider:
• Stochastic Approximation [6], which is a hill
climbing approach with hyperparameters
individually
and
sequentially
changed.
Previously applied to GRLVQI in [6].
• Bayesian optimization (BO) [30] whereby the
objective function is treated as a random function
and randomly determined hyperparameters taken
from the appropriate distribution around the
results are found. BO tends to find reasonably
good choices of hyperparameters, but this has not
been rigorously studied for cyber applications yet
The concern with all such hyperparameter
optimization methods is finding locally optimal
solutions, which are potentially significantly different
from the globally optimal solutions. Unless one
explores all possible setting combinations, which is

1

1

often impossible, it is never possible to be certain that
one has arrived at the globablly optimal solution. Thus,
the different algorithm families aim to address this
through different strategies: replications in DoE,
replications and embracing randomness in modelbased approaches, etc.

3.1. Grid Search Approaches
A grid search involves creating a set of design point
combinations to explore [31]. Examples include ad hoc
approaches and factorial designs [31]. Factorial
experiments consider all combinations to understand
significance of factors, interaction of factors, and to
find viable operating points. The state of the art in DoE
includes space-saving designs which explore a
logically chosen subset of all combinations of settings.
Grid searches can involve multiple steps as well.
As described in [5], these steps can include:
1. Initial design execution
2. Optimal solution
a. Spreadsheet search
b. Response surface methods (RSMs)
For an algorithm such as GRLVQI, there could be 243
(35) models to create and evaluate in order to explore
the combinations from 3 settings for each of the 5
factors [5]. The spreadsheet search then is merely
finding the best result from these runs [5]. The RSM
further explores the space by considering an analysis of
variance of the factors and their interactions and then
by fitting a second order model to the data [5]. From
this, new algorithm settings are computed to explore
and, hopefully, a better result is found [5].

3.2. Stochastic Approximation
A general stochastic approximation method is the
Kiefer and Wolfowitz approach of sequential design
[6]. Here, we will let ℎ𝑖,𝑗 be the value of the 𝑖 𝑡ℎ of 𝑁
continuous valued hyperparameter of the function of
interest at iteration 𝑗 of an optimization procedure.
From this, 𝒉𝑗 is a vector of these hyperparameters. Let
𝑓(𝒉𝑗 ) be the performance measure of interest of our
function of interest. Finally, let {𝑎𝑛 } and {𝑐𝑖 } be
sequences
∑∞
𝑖=1 𝑎𝑖 = ∞ ,
∑∞
𝑖=1 𝑎𝑛 𝑐𝑛 < ∞ ,
2 −2
1
∑∞
𝑖=1 𝑎𝑛 𝑐𝑛 < ∞ .

(5)

Using (5), let 𝒄𝑗𝑖 = (𝟎𝑖−1 , 𝑐𝑗 , 𝟎𝑁−𝑖 ) where 𝟎𝑛 is a
vector of zeroes of size 𝑛. The algorithm works as

1

Suggested sequences are {𝑎𝑛 } = 𝑛 and 𝑐𝑛 = 𝑛−3
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follows: with 𝝉 being a termination criteria and 𝒇(𝒉𝒊 )
representing the objective function value. Also, let
|𝒉𝒊 − 𝒉𝒊−𝟏 | be the L1 norm of 𝒉𝒊 and 𝒉𝒊−𝟏 . The
algorithm then iterates over

(6)

with one hyperparameter at a time changed. The
algorithm terminates when the norm of the differences
between 𝑓(𝒉) of two consective iterations is small. In
operation, the process changes one individual
hyperparameter’s value at a time and looks at objective
function results when an upper, 𝑓(𝒉𝑗 + 𝒄𝑗1 ), and lower,
𝑓(𝒉𝑗 − 𝒄𝑗1 ), value of the hyperparameter is used.

3.3. Bayesian Optimization (BO)
BO similarly considers ℎ𝑖,𝑗 and 𝒉𝑗 ; but additionally,
ℎ𝑖,𝑗 is in the bounded set ℋ𝑖 , which can be continuous
or integer valued. BO notes that 𝑓(𝒉𝑗 ) is stochastic in
nature due to the randomness in the results as a function
of the random selection of training data [11]. For BO,
𝑛
let 𝑦𝑗 = 𝑓(𝒉𝑗 ) and let {𝑦𝑗 , ℎ𝑗 }𝑗=1 be a sequence of 𝑦𝑗
and ℎ𝑗 pairs. Based on this sequence, a Gaussian
𝑛

process can be fit to 𝑓(∙), denoted by 𝐺𝑃 ({𝑦𝑗 , ℎ𝑗 }𝑗=1 ).
𝑛

𝑗=1

𝑛𝑘

denoted as 𝐺𝑃 ({𝑦𝑗 , ℎ𝑗 }𝑗=1 ).
𝑛𝑘

Set 𝒉𝑗+1 = argmax 𝑎 (𝒉|𝐺𝑃 ({𝑦𝑗 , ℎ𝑗 }𝑗=1 ))
𝒉

for

Approaches such as CRISP-DM, provide general
end-to-end processes to develop ML solutions [11].
Work in [11] extended CRISP-DM by expanding the
Data, Modeling, and Evaluation layers to include 1)
selecting a dataset, 2) selecting an AI algorithm, and
then 3) automatically determining hyperparameter
settings without expert algorithmic knowledge.
Herein, we consider the CRISP-DM+ items of [11]:
A1. Data Wrangling for the Z-Wave RF-DNA
problem, this was presented in Sections 2.2 and 2.3.
A2. Select ML Architecture this was presented in
Sections 2.4 and 2.5 for both the GRLVQI algorithms
and the performance metrics of interest.
B1. Train ML Model Using Default Weights
generally involves taking the algorithm from A2, and
finding a starting point from either default settings or
example settings from help documentation [11].
Herein, this involves baselining with known settings.
B2. Optimize Hyperparameters involves finding
reasonable settings via hyperparameter optimization
methods. Of concern is determining initial ranges for
the weights for the hyperparameter optimization
methods. For BO, this could include the extreme limits
of the design space, but not for SA and grid searches.
C. Test & Compare Optimized Model. This will
consider the classification and verification evaluation
methods previously described in Section 2.5.

4. Experimental Results

)) , an acquisition

function, is maximized to find a new set of candiate
hyperpameters. While 𝑎(∙) can be chosen by the BO
designer, common choices are expected improvement,
probability of improvement, and lower confidence
bounds [11]; expected improvement was used herein.
Sequentially, BO follows the following steps [11]:
1. Obtain 𝑛0 initial evaluations of 𝑓(∙) at
randomly selected values of hyperparameters
within the specified hyperparameter bounds.
Set 𝑘 = 0.
𝑛𝑘
2. Fit a Gaussian Process onto {𝑦𝑗 , ℎ𝑗 }𝑗=1 ,

3.

Evaluate 𝑦𝑗+1 = 𝑓(𝒉𝑗+1 ), set 𝑛𝑘 = 𝑗 + 1 and
𝑘 = 𝑘 + 1. If termination criteria 𝝉 is not
met, go-to step 2.

3.4. CRISP-DM+
Approach
Hyperparameter Optimization

ℎ1,𝑗+1
⋮
ℎ𝑖,𝑗+1
⋮
[ℎ𝑛,𝑗+1 ]
𝑓(𝒉𝑗 + 𝒄𝑗1 ) − 𝑓(𝒉𝑗 − 𝒄𝑗1 )
⋮
𝑎𝑖
=
𝑓(𝒉𝑗 + 𝒄𝑗𝑖 )−𝑓(𝒉𝑗 − 𝒄𝑗𝑖 )
2𝑐𝑖
⋮
𝑁
𝑁
)
𝑓(𝒉
+
𝒄
−
𝑓(𝒉
[
𝑗
𝑗 − 𝒄𝑗 )]
𝑗

Finally, 𝑎 (𝒉|𝐺𝑃 ({𝑦𝑗 , ℎ𝑗 }

4.

To provide a general comparison of methods, this
work considers four different methods of
hyperparameter optimization: 1) a grid-search using a
full factorial design and a spreadsheet search for the
best result (GRLVQI-SS), 2) a response surface
method extended upon the factorial design (GRLVQIRSM), 3) stochastic approximation (GRLVQI-SA),
and 4) BO (GRLVQI-BO). This is compared against
both 5) the baseline experientially determined settings
of [5] (GRLVQI-base), and 6) MDA.

4.1. Hyperparameter Design Region
Considerations
Although hyperparameter optimization removes
the problems of finding initial algorithm settings, the
new problem is determining bounds for the search
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region for each hyperparameter. As discussed in [5],
limited prior work on GRLVQI hyperparameters for
any purpose, let alone RF Fingerprinting, exists. Some
general guidelines on settings do exist, and these
include 1) values should be non-negative (negative
learning rates would cause PVs to deviate from
learning goals), and 2) a general recommendation that
0≤𝜉(𝑡)≤𝜖(𝑡)≤1 [5]. Similar guidance does not exist for
the conscience parameters, beyond non-negativity.
Additionally, the only general guidance on PVs is that
too few will not capture the data well and too many will
overfit. Capturing these guidelines, using limits outside
previously explored conscience rates, we have the
general search region displayed in Table 1.

SA will implement a hill-climbing approach and look
for individual improvements to each hyperparameter.
BO can explore the entire space of Table 1 and was
allowed to do so. SA needs a good initial operating
point to improve upon; thus, as presented in [6], SA
approached the problem by improving up on the
experimentally
determined
𝒉𝟎 =
(0.025, 0.005, 2.5,3.5) [6]. For comparison across
methods, the same computational “budget” of 35
design points was given to BO and SA as well. In SA
much of this is spent by exploring the 4 continuous
hyperparamters (𝜖, 𝜉, 𝛾, 𝛽) with changes of ±c as seen
in (6). Thus, SA could only perform 31 full iterations
(248 points) while BO could explore 243 unique points.
In all cases, maximizing RAP was the objective and all
algorithms were optimized for TNG set performance.

Table 1. General Hyperparameter Search
Region for GRLVQI
Param.

Meaning

𝜖
𝜉
𝛾
𝛽

Learning Rate

Initial Search
Interval
[0, 1]

Relevance Learning Rate

[0, 1]

𝜖

Conscience Rate 1

[0, 10]

Conscience Rate 2
Number of Prototype Vectors
(PVs) per class

[0, 2]

𝜉

NPV

Table 2. Experimental design region for
GRLVQI from [5]
Param.

𝛾
𝛽

[2, 28]

NPV

As seen in [5], traditional DoE need meaningful
bounds to explore since the combination of settings
from the extreme points of the interval are explored.
Thus, Table 1 would be an impossibly wide interval
with mostly unusable results (from learning rates of 0).
Thus, the work of [5] explored values near the
experimentally
determined
𝒉𝟎 =
(0.025, 0.005, 2.5, 3.5, 10) per [5]. For this, 243 (35)
points were explored (high, centered, low).
BO and SA operate different than the DoE. Both
can explore the space but do so in a different manner.
BO will begin to model the response as a random
process and collect seemingly random observations;

Meaning
Learning Rate
Relevance Learning
Rate
Conscience Rate 1

Search Interval
[0.0025, 0.025, 0.25]

Conscience Rate 2
Number of Prototype
Vectors (PVs) per class

[0.15, 0.35, 0.55]

[0.0005, 0.005, 0.05]
[0.5, 2.0, 4.5]

[7, 10, 13]

4.2. Results
Figure 4 presents the classification performance
from the optimal from each method using the TST set
of %C versus SNR for 1) GRLVQI-BO, 2) GRLVQISA), 3) GRLVQI-RSM, 4) GRLVQI-SS, 5) GRLVQIbase, and 6) MDA. Notably, GRLVQI outperforms
MDA, and each optimization method providing further
improvements with BO being the best.
Table 3 condenses the results and presents
verification performance. In Table 3, RAP values were

Table 3. Hyperparameters optimization comparative results, performance results in bold indicate best or within
5% of the best by column
PERFORMANCE RESULTS
VERIFICATION
AT SNR = 20DB

FACTORS LEVELS
Method

CLASSIFICATION

NRUNS
A

B

C

D

E

GSNR (DB) AT
%C = 90%

TNG
GRLVQI-BO*
243
0.868 0.0014 6.881 0.392 3
+7.02
GRLVQI-SA
248†
0.078 0.016 2.527 0.319 7
+5.16
GRLVQI-SS
243
0.25
0.05
2.0
0.35
7
+5.30
GRLVQI-RSM
249
0.150
0.05
4.5
0.15
7
+5.23
GRLVQI-base
N/A
0.025 0.005
2.5
0.35 10
+3.72
MDA
N/A
N/A
+1.68
*Proposed herein.
†For 31 iteration; it should be noted that [6] also performed 10 replications per iteration

TST
+5.89
+5.05
+5.77
+5.26
+3.32
0.00

RAP (%)
TNG
69.21
65.33
67.39
66.57
62.63
68.27

TST
68.57
64.79
65.80
65.33
61.26
55.5

TVR
(%)

AUCM

100
66
66
66
33
100

0.982
0.965
0.979
0.967
0.936
0.971
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computed relative to perfect results and thus RAP is a
percentages of the area under a method’s %C vs SNR
plot. Here we see that GRLVQI outperforms MDA and
the baseline GRLVQI significantly with progressively
better classification performance as one moves up the
table. BO notably provides considerably better
performance across all classification metrics.
Additionally, Table 3 includes verification
accuracy performance of all algorithms.
Nonintuitively, GRLVQI has generally underperformed
MDA at verification. Prior hyperparameter
optimization attempts, see [5] [6], improved both
verification and classification performance, but could
not achieve %C = 100% authorized. However, the best
design point from BO was able to achieve %C = 100%
while outperforming all other methods for
classification. Thus, the BO optimized GRLVQI offers
considerably improved performance over baseline
GRLVQI and MDA which was achieved with a
reasonable computation budget.

Figure 7 for RAP versus learning rate and NPV. These
surfaces exhibit a similarly high variablilty and
illustrate the difficulty in finding acceptable
operational settings.
Figure 8 overlays both the DoE points (red x’s) of
Table 2 and the SA design points (black o’s) onto a
subset of Figure 5. The path of SA shows the
sequential approach of this method and SA notably
explored only a small region of the space. Conversely,
the DoE approach is seen to explore more of the space,
but demonstrates an inefficiency in that many runs
appear wasted due to the design being full factorial in
nature. Thus, these data suggest that a space saving
design would be more efficient. However, as Figure 8
shows that both SA and DoE explored only a small
region of Figure 5, BO has further advantages in
exploring more of the hyperparameter space.

4.2. Results, Digging Deeper
As seen in Table 3 and noted in [6], very different
combinations of settings can yield acceptable results.
Thus, it is expected that multiple local maxima exist.
To further investigate this, we can explore the surface
of design points and results. Figure 5 presents this
surface for RAP versus the learning rate and relevance
learning rate. Blue dots are the explored points and the
surface is interpolated between points; the best value
obtained by a small red X in the lower right. Figure 5
shows that the highest RAP values are located in
different areas of the parameter space with the surface
itself is surprisingly variable.

Figure 4. Classification performance for the TST
set on evaluated algorithms
Further exploration of the hyperprameter space is
seen in Figure 6 for RAP versus conscience rates, and

Figure 5. RAP results versus learning rate and
relevance rate. GRLVQI-BO is red x (right).

Figure 6. RAP results versus Conscience rate 1
and Conscience rate 2. GRLVQI-BO is red x
(middle right).
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Figure 8. Overlay of SA (black O’s) and DoE (red
X’s) approaches to hyperparameter optimization
onto a small region, the lower middle, of Figure 5.

improvements
to
communication
device
discrimination using RF Fingerprints by: 1) applying
a CRISP-DM+ approach to hyperparameter
optimization for RF Fingerprinting, 2) demonstration
of this approach for GRLVQI optimization for ZWave device discrimination, 3) improvements in the
experimental approach of RF Fingerprinting classifier
development, 4) an understanding of the
hyperparameter space for complex cyber problems
and algorithms, and 5) a comparison of 4
hyperparameter optimization methods. In total we
compared Bayesian Optimization (BO), Stochastic
Approximation (SA), Design of Experiments (DoE)
with both a Spreadsheet Search (SS) and Response
Surface Methodology (RSM). The systematic
application of Bayesian Optimization (BO) was able
to find GRLVQI algorithm settings that exceeded all
prior bests at both classification and verification with
100% verification accuracy achieved. The results
further showed limitations in SA and DoE-based
approaches which explored considerably more limited
regions of the hyperparameter space.
The theme of future work, in general, considers
deeper understanding of the hyperparameter tradeoff
space, including evaluating the robustness of these
GRLVQI hyperparameters for other WPAN devices.
Future work could also include combining
methodologies, like refining initial BO solutions with
SA, and appropriately handling variables that vary
logarithmically, linearly, and as integers. Additionally,
broader comparisons with other optimization methods
additionally needs to be considered.

5. Conclusions
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hyperparameter optimization for WPAN device
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operational security of GRLVQI for RF Fingerprinting
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explored the application of four hyperparameter
optimization methods to finding good settings.
This work illustrated the necessity in determining
appropriate GRLVQI algorithm settings and provided
a further understanding of the hyperparameter and
response relationship. Primary contributions include
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Figure 7. RAP results versus learning rate and
PVs. GRLVQI-BO is red x (right).
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